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Abstract:  
 
Section 81 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 has a tumultuous past. It has faced various criticisms 
surrounding its potential for undermining indefeasibility of title, a key concept under our Torrens system 
of transfer. This paper addresses some of these criticisms, positing first that s 81 does in fact grant the 
District Land Registrar a wide discretion to correct or cancel titles which have been gained fraudulently 
or wrongfully, and secondly that this discretion should be exercised if an appropriate case surfaces. 
Such an exercise is supported by the approach taken in other Torrens jurisdictions and can be regulated 
through the adoption of a number of simple guidelines, to be considered during any exercise of discretion 
under s 81. This will reduce the risk of any uncertainty arising from a wide interpretation of s 81 and 
ensure that the overall justice of the case is the central consideration of any exercise of discretion. 
Key words: Land Transfer Act 1952, s 81, District Land Registrar, powers of correction, meaning of 
“wrongful”, indefeasibility  
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I Introduction  
 
Everyone knows the story of Pandora’s Box. Overcome with fatal curiosity Pandora opened the 
box given to her by Zeus—King of the Gods—and released evil into the world, turning it to 
darkness. This analogy has been used to describe the potential effect of s 81 of the Land Transfer 
Act 1952 (LTA) on the principle of indefeasibility of title in New Zealand.  
 
Private property is the foundation upon which modern capitalist society is built, governing how 
we interact and form relationships: “security of land ownership and tenure is a fundamental 
building block of most developed economies”.1 As noted during the introduction of New 
Zealand’s first Real Property Bill, “the highest ambition of most people appears to be to obtain 
a homestead for themselves … all are animated by the desire of having a piece of the world they 
may call their own.”2  
 
Thus we take the mechanisms by which we protect owners’ rights and oversee the purchase and 
transfer of land in New Zealand  very seriously:3 
 
[I[f the possession of landed property be a matter of so much consequence, it must 
necessarily be also a matter of much consequence that the evidence of the title of persons 
to the ownership of property, and facilities for its transfer, should be secured and facilitated 
… by law. 
 
The LTA sets out the mechanisms by which we protect the rights of those who deal with land. 
It is based on the Torrens system of land transfer, which is in turn underpinned by indefeasibility 
of title: upon registration of an interest in land, a person gains a title which cannot be impugned. 
Some commentators fear that s 81—which gives discretionary powers to the District Land 
Registrar (Registrar) to correct or cancel the register where title is entered fraudulently or 
wrongfully—threatens this cornerstone principle. They believe certainty should be the 
overriding principle of the land transfer system and is best achieved by having as few exceptions 
to indefeasibility as possible. That a wide interpretation of s 81 could grant broad discretionary 
powers to correct the register has led to the provision being described as “Pandora’s box”,4 and 
a “time bomb ticking beneath the concept of indefeasibility”.5 What this fails to account for is 
  
1  David Grinlinton (ed) Torrens in the Twenty-first Century (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2003) at ix.  
2  (August 23 1870) 9 NZPD 194.   
3  At 194.    
4  GW Hinde and others Hinde McMorland & Sim Land Law in New Zealand (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 
2004) at [9.027].  
5  GW Hinde and DW McMorland Butterworths Land Law in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 
1997) at [2.069].  
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that rigid adherence to indefeasibility of title, particularly “immediate” indefeasibility, can lead 
to injustice. This paper analyses the scope of the Registrar’s powers to determine precisely how 
far-reaching they are, followed by a critical examination of whether these powers (if they exist) 
should be exercised at all.  
 
This paper argues that s 81 does grant substantial powers to the Registrar and these are a logical 
extension of existing exceptions to indefeasibility. While such an interpretation may somewhat 
undermine indefeasibility of title, the Registrar should exercise these powers if the occasion 
calls for it. This paper does not suggest New Zealand’s current immediate indefeasibility 
approach should be overturned completely, but an exercise of s 81 powers will often be in the 
interests of justice and will not collapse the land transfer system.  
 
II Background to the Torrens System and Indefeasibility of Title 
A Aims of the Torrens System 
The Torrens system was first introduced by Sir Robert Torrens in South Australia through the 
Real Property Act 1861.6 It sought to provide an alternative to the deed system prevalent in 
England which had become expensive, inefficient and uncertain. The deed system was based 
on nemo dat (“no one gives what he does not have”): if any transfer in the chain of title is 
defective (for example, fraud), anyone who subsequently obtained title would be vulnerable to 
adverse claims. Thus an expensive and time consuming investigation of title during 
conveyancing was necessary—usually costing a substantial percentage of the value of the land 
being purchased.7 Only a small class of people in England could afford to own land however, 
so the issues with the deed system were not as prominent as they became in a new colony such 
as Australia, where land was readily available, and relatively cheap.  
 
The Torrens system has two main aims: to provide security to owners of land and to facilitate 
ease of transfer and protect purchasers.8 It is based on three simple principles:9 
 
  
6  Real Property Act 1861 (SA).  
7  Douglas Whalan “Immediate Success of Registration of Title in Australasia and Early Failures in 
England” (1967) 2 NZULR 419 at 423.  
8  Richard Torrens The South Australian system of conveyancing by registration of title: with instructions 
for the guidance of parties dealing, illustrated by copies of the books and forms in use in the Land Titles 
Office (Register and Observer Printing Offices, Adelaide, 1859); and Law Commission A New Land 
Transfer Act (NZLC 116, 2010) at [1.11].  
9  T Ruoff An Englishman Looks at the Torrens System (Law Book Co, Sydney, 1957) as cited in Tom 
Bennion and others New Zealand Land Law (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2009) at 39; and GW Hinde 
“Indefeasibility of Title since Frazer v Walker” in GW Hinde (ed) The New Zealand Torrens System 
Centennial Essays (Butterworths, Wellington, 1971) 33 at 33.  
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(a) the “mirror” principle—the register should accurately and completely mirror the state of 
title; 
(b) the “curtain” principle—purchasers should be able to rely on the register for an accurate 
description of the interests attached to property and not concern themselves with other 
interests lying behind the curtain of the register; and 
(c) the “insurance” principle—if the mirror of title gives an incorrect reflection and as a result 
a person incurs a loss, it should be met by a State assurance fund. 
 
These principles are reflected in legislation from around the world which establish a system of 
title by registration. In such systems the purchaser is entitled to rely on the register for accurate 
information about existing interests, registration confers indefeasible title, and the State 
guarantees this title, accepting responsibility for mistakes through a system of compensation. 
These three principles are given life through the concept of indefeasibility of title and underlie 
one of the major tensions running through any Torrens system: the conflicting interests of 
owners and purchasers.  
B Indefeasibility of Title 
1 Overview 
Indefeasibility of title means that, once registered, a person’s interest in a particular plot of land 
is impervious to adverse claims. However, the term is a misnomer;10 the LTA does not grant 
truly indefeasible title. There are various exceptions which confer on certain persons the ability 
to defeat a registered title holder’s interest. As explained by Lord Wilberforce in Frazer v 
Walker, indefeasibility of title is: 11 
 
[A] convenient description of the immunity from attack by adverse claim … which a 
registered proprietor enjoys … It does not involve that the registered proprietor is protected 
against any claim whatsoever, [for] there are provisions by which the entry on which he 
relies may be cancelled or corrected, or he may be exposed to claims in personam. These 
are matters not to be overlooked when a total description of his rights is required. But as 
registered proprietor and while he remains as such, no adverse claim (except as specifically 
admitted) may be brought against him. 
2 Exceptions 
There are three principal exceptions to indefeasibility of title in New Zealand which can allow 
a person to defeat the title of a registered interest holder: 
  
10  GW Hinde, DW McMorland and PBA Sim Land Law (Butterworths, Wellington, 1976) vol 1 at [2.056] 
and [2.065]. 
11  Frazer v Walker [1967] NZLR 1069 (PC) at 1075−1076 [Frazer].  
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(1) Those contained in statute—either expressly stated in the LTA, or contained in other 
Acts which may be read as overriding the LTA.12 
(2) Fraud under the LTA. For this there needs to be actual dishonesty, or a suspicion of 
wrongdoing and a failure to act, by the owner and registered proprietor or their agent.13 
(3) Claims in personam. The courts will not allow the holder of a registered interest under 
the LTA to hide behind their indefeasible title to avoid obligations that they have 
undertaken personally.14  
3 Immediate or Deferred? 
The LTA does not define indefeasibility. Indeed, “indefeasible” is used only twice in the entire 
Act, and those only in minor provisions. This has caused controversy around the courts’ 
application of indefeasibility. The Act offers little guidance about which provisions should carry 
greater weight, and Parliament has not indicated which way certain sections should be 
interpreted. This has led to conflict in the courts, and major debate between those who prefer a 
“deferred indefeasibility” approach, and those who prefer “immediate indefeasibility”— 
approaches which are “as similar as two completely dissimilar things in a pod”.15 Both 
interpretations have featured at different points in time; the choice between the two is a key 
differentiator amongst the various land registration systems around the world.16 The 
distinguishing feature between them is where each places the emphasis between the conflicting 
interests underlying the Torrens system: security of title (achieved by protecting the rights of 
current registered proprietors), and facility of purchase (through the protection of purchasers). 
In other words, the difference between the two approaches is where they strike the balance 
between static and dynamic security.17 
 
In the case of deferred indefeasibility, title obtained through fraud or the registration of a void 
or voidable instrument can be defeated by the previous registered title holder until title is 
“perfected” by a subsequent transaction with a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration.18 
However, under immediate indefeasibility, a purchaser for value who becomes the registered 
  
12  For example see Miller v Minister of Mines [1963] NZLR 560 (PC). 
13  Assets v Mere Roihi [1905] AC 176 (PC). 
14  Frazer, above n 11.  
15  Rowan Atkinson as Edmund Blackadder “Duel and Duality” in Richard Curtis and Ben Elton Blackadder 
the Third (S02:E06, BBC Television, first broadcast 22 October 1987) at 3 min. 
16  Pamela O’Connor “Registration of Invalid Dispositions: Who Gets the Property?” in Elizabeth Cooke 
(ed) Modern Studies in Property (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005) 45 at 47.  
17  R Demogue “Security” in Fouillé and others (eds) Modern French Legal Philosphy (Augustus M Kelley, 
New York, 1968), at ch XIII as cited in O’Connor, above n 16, at 47. 
18  Bennion, above n 9, at 53.  
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proprietor of an estate acquires, in the absence of fraud, an indefeasible title—even if the 
instrument of registration was void or voidable.19  
 
Deferred indefeasibility favours static security. This term describes rules protecting the interests 
of existing title holders against purchasers. It reflects the idea that property should not be 
alienated by the act of another without the owner’s consent.20 It is static as it seeks to preserve 
the status quo in terms of the existing allocation of property. Salmond J explained this when he 
said “the effect of registration is to perfect the purchaser’s title notwithstanding defects in the 
vendor’s registered title”, but that this is different to “whether registration also validates, as 
between the parties themselves, all defects in the instrument registered”.21  
 
Conversely, immediate indefeasibility places more weight on dynamic security, which seeks to 
protect the reasonable expectations of purchasers that they will acquire a title free of unknown 
prior claims and defects.22 This opposing principle is designed to facilitate transactions and 
provide incentives to acquire assets “for productive purposes” as purchasers are assured of 
having an indefeasible title—inasmuch as the law can grant one.23 
 
The difficulty faced by many jurisdictions is deciding where to strike the balance. If a strict, 
absolute approach to immediate indefeasibility is taken, the line falls too far on the side of 
dynamic security. While this is beneficial when ensuring the ease and brevity of transactions, it 
provides little protection to existing owners who may be deprived of their property without 
consent.   
4 The New Zealand Approach  
The choice between adopting immediate or deferred indefeasibility in New Zealand has been 
hotly contested and attitudes have varied greatly.24 In New Zealand indefeasibility of title is 
said to be established by ss 62, 63, 75, 182 and 183 of the LTA. These are the root of the legal 
effect of registration in New Zealand and the State’s guarantee of title. However, as the Act 
does not actually define indefeasibility, debate centres on what exactly the Act provides for: 
immediate indefeasibility? Deferred indefeasibility? Discretionary indefeasibility? Salmond J 
opined that the Act was “so badly drafted … it was difficult to harmonise these sections”.25 This 
  
19  At 53. 
20  O’Connor, above n 16, at 47–48. 
21  Boyd v Mayor of Wellington [1924] NZLR 1174 (CA) at 1202 per Salmond J. 
22  O’Connor, above n 16, at 47–48. 
23  At 48. 
24  See Gibbs v Messer [1891] AC 248 (PC); Frazer, above n 11; Westpac New Zealand Ltd v Clark [2010] 
1 NZLR 82 (SC); and Law Commission, above n 8.  
25  Boyd v Mayor of Wellington, above n 21, at 1211 per Salmond J (dissenting). 
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led for many years to a lack of clarity which is unbecoming of a jurisdiction based on Torrens 
principles of transfer.  
 
The debate was largely concluded following the Privy Council decision in Frazer, which most 
have interpreted as signifying that New Zealand applies the principles of immediate 
indefeasibility in all cases other than fraud.26 This interpretation of indefeasibility is based on 
what is thought to be the ‘correct’ legal interpretation of the Torrens statute.27 Unfortunately, 
this has been largely driven by the tendency to view indefeasibility as a “sacred principle”.28 
Mason noted this interpretation “is not based on a considered assessment of the comparative 
benefits and detriments associated with each of the two versions of indefeasibility”.29 
Nonetheless, immediate indefeasibility as the accepted practice is unlikely to change. It does 
not need to change. However, it should not interfere with the application of other principles 
within the Torrens system. 
 
The courts have latterly used the theory of immediate indefeasibility to help interpret the 
provisions of the LTA and the powers within it, rather than using the Act to help interpret how 
we apply indefeasibility; “the tail has wagged the dog”.30 This has often led to a restrictive 
reading of s 81 in an attempt to make the powers granted within comply with our conception of 
indefeasibility, rather than looking objectively at the kind of security the Act was meant to 
achieve. 
 
III Does the Registrar have wide powers of correction? 
 
The focus of most academic critics is s 81(1), which provides the following:31 
 
81    Surrender of instrument obtained through fraud, etc 
(1) Where it appears to the satisfaction of the Registrar that any certificate of title or other 
instrument has been issued in error, or contains any misdescription if land or of boundaries, 
or that any entry or endorsement has been made in error, or that any grant, certificate, 
instrument, entry or endorsement has been fraudulently or wrongfully obtained, or is 
fraudulently or wrongfully retained, he may require the person to whom that grant, 
  
26  Frazer, above n 11.  
27  Sir Anthony Mason “Indefeasibility – Logic or Legend?” in David Grinlinton (ed) Torrens in the Twenty-
first Century (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2003) 3 at 17. 
28  At 17. 
29  At 17. 
30  Struan Scott “Indefeasibility of Title and the Registrar’s ‘Unwelcome’ S81 Powers” 1998−2000 7 Canta 
LR 246 at 247. 
31  Land Transfer Act 1952, s 81(1) (emphasis added).  
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certificate, or instrument has been so issued, or by whom it is retained, to deliver up the 
same for the purpose of being cancelled or corrected, as the case may require.  
 
Under this section there are three grounds a person can cite for correction of the register. First, 
where an instrument has been issued in error or contains a misdescription. Second, where any 
entry or endorsement has been issued in error, and thirdly, where any entry or endorsement has 
been fraudulently or wrongfully obtained or retained. The first two are generally well 
understood and thought to be covered by the express exceptions to indefeasibility elucidated in 
ss 62 and 63 of the Act.32 Thus it is the third which has caused so much controversy.  
 
The LTA does not define fraud. However, the decision in Assets v Mere Roihi definitively 
described what constitutes fraud for the purposes of the LTA.33 Fraud is a paramount exception 
to indefeasibility as is clearly stated in ss 62 and 63. Any confusion around the scope and 
applicability of s 81 therefore stems from the myriad interpretations of “wrongfully”. 
A “Wrongfully” 
In Frazer the Privy Council suggested that references to “fraudulently” and “wrongfully” in s 
81 were not synonymous when they stated “as well as in the case of fraud, where any grant, 
certificate, instrument, entry, or endorsement has been wrongfully obtained or is wrongfully 
retained, the Registrar has power of cancellation and correction”.34  However, “wrongfully” is 
not defined in the Act and is an inherently ambiguous and contested concept. This has caused 
much consternation, particularly because if the legislation does give the Registrar power to 
decide on substantive issues and to act on them (and it appears that it does), then “the Registrar 
could do what the High Court could not”.35 
The courts have struggled with this issue since Frazer, and have in various judgments expressed 
an opinion on what may or may not fall under “wrongfully” in s 81. For the purposes of this 
paper the wide approach suggested by McMorland is adopted.36 Where a person gains a 
registered interest directly under a void or voidable instrument, they will have done so 
wrongfully.37 This “includes all instruments which are void or voidable for whatever reason”.38 
  
32  DW McMorland “Registrar’s Powers of Correction” (1968) 6 NZLJ 138 at 140.  
33  Assets v Mere Roihi, above n 13.  
34  Frazer, above n 11, at 1079 (emphasis added). 
35  Hinde and others, above n 4, at [9.027]. 
36  McMorland, above n 32. 
37  At 141. 
38  At 141. 
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Various other interpretations exist, but these are generally attempts by courts to restrict s 81 by 
giving “wrongfully” as narrow an interpretation as possible.  
Using basic principles of statutory interpretation, given that “wrongfully” appears alongside 
“fraudulently” they must have distinctive meanings. “Wrongfully” then is wide enough to 
encompass situations other than registration through fraud. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines “wrongful” as “not fair, just, or legal” and suggests various synonyms including 
“improper” and “illegitimate”.39 The Collins English Dictionary posits that it includes acts 
which are “immoral, unjust, or illegal”.40 This supports a wide interpretation of “wrongfully”. 
Any title which is gained through the registration of a void or voidable instrument can be seen 
as improperly or incorrectly registered, and therefore “wrongfully” entered on the register.  
B Section 81 and the Courts 
The courts have had a tumultuous relationship with s 81, at times appearing to accept the 
Registrar has extensive powers in the case of “wrongful” entries on the register, and at others 
attempting to read down the section as much as possible.41  This paper will spend little time 
analysing the courts treatment of s 81 since this has been covered at length in other works; 
nonetheless some background is necessary.42  
 
It is accepted that whatever the scope of the Registrar’s powers, they must be read subject to s 
183, which protects subsequent bona fide purchasers who give valuable consideration from 
obtaining faulty title due to a defect in the title of the previous registered proprietor.43  
 
Some early cases found the Registrar was entitled to rectify the register in situations where the 
transferee had gained title through a void instrument.44 The Privy Council in Frazer thought 
that “[t]he powers of the Registrar under s 81 are significant and extensive”.45 McGechan J in 
the High Court acknowledged that a liberal approach to s 81 is the correct one, saying he saw 
  
39  Concise Oxford English Dictionary Angus Stevenson and Maurice Waite (ed) (12th ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011) at 1667. 
40  Collins English Dictionary (online edition, 2015) http://www.collinsdictionary.com.  
41  See Frazer, above n 11; Housing Corporation of New Zealand v Maori Trustee [1988] 2 NZLR 662 (HC) 
[Housing Corporation]; Congregational Christian Church of Samoa Henderson Trust Board v 
Broadlands Finance Ltd [1984] 2 NZLR 704 (HC); and Nathan v Dollars & Sense Finance Ltd [2007] 2 
NZLR 747 (CA) [Dollars & Sense]. Note that statements made by the CA in Dollars & Sense were not 
discussed in the judgment of the Supreme Court on appeal.  
42  For example see Hinde, above n 9; GW Hinde and others Principles of real property law (2nd ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2014) at 343−347; and David Grinlinton “The Registrar’s Powers of Correction” 
in David Grinlinton (ed) Torrens in the Twenty-first Century (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2003) 217.  
43  See Assets Co v Mere Roihi, above n 13; and Frazer v Walker, above n 11, at 1079. 
44  See De Chateau v Child [1928] NZLR 63 and District Land Registrar v Thompson [1922] NZLR 627. 
45  Frazer, above n 11, at 1072 (emphasis added).  
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“no escape from the conclusion that s 81 is alive and well, however unwelcome”.46 In related 
proceedings the Court of Appeal referenced this statement without objection.47 A number of 
more recent cases have expressed the view that the Registrar could use s 81 to resolve incorrect 
Maori land registrations.48  
 
Others however have played down the scope of s 81 by expressing strong views on the negative 
impact on indefeasibility that a wide interpretation would have. Beattie J in Chan v Lower Hutt 
City Corporation said that “if the argument [for a wide interpretation] were to succeed then the 
doctrine of immediate indefeasibility would receive a major set-back. There would be much 
uncertainty as to the effect on the titles in this kind of case”.49 Barker J in the High Court claimed 
“[w]rongful registration involves something more than that the instrument pursuant to which it 
was procured was void or that the certificate of correctness was erroneous for that reason”,50 
and that:51  
 
[T]here should be no reason for holding that registration has been “wrongfully” obtained, 
if the registered proprietor or mortgagee acted honestly and in good faith and where he or 
his solicitors had diligently carried out every conveyancing procedure normally required 
and appropriate in the circumstances. 
 
The most recent cases considering the Registrar’s s 81 powers are the decisions of the Court of 
Appeal in Nathan v Dollars & Sense Finance Ltd, and Minister of Conservation v Maori Land 
Court.52 In Dollars & Sense the Court took a conservative approach:53 
 
[Section] 81 either does not permit the impeachment of a title which is indefeasible under 
ss 62 and 63 (which is perhaps the predominant view) or alternatively, as a matter of 
practice, would (or should) not be invoked for that purpose …  
 
 
  
46  Housing Corporation, above n 41, at 699.  
47  Housing Corporation of New Zealand v Maori Trustee (No 2) [1988] 2 NZLR 708 (CA) at 717. 
48  See Pakiri R Block and Rahui te Kuri Inc (Maori Appellate Court, 1/93, 23 March 1994); and Waipuka 
3B1B1 and Waipuka 3B1B2B1C2 A Block (1993) 135 Napier MC 164 (Rotorua, 23 July 1993). 
49  Chan v Lower Hutt City Corporation [1976] 2 NZLR 75 at 85.  
50  Congregational Christian Church of Samoa Henderson Trust Board v Broadlands Finance Ltd, above n 
41, at 714. 
51  At 715. 
52  See Dollars & Sense, above n 41; and Minister of Conservation v Maori Land Court [2008] NZCA 564, 
[2009] 3 NZLR 465 [Minister of Conservation].  
53  Dollars & Sense, above n 41, at [36] per William Young P. 
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Glazebrook J added:54 
 
[I]t is unlikely that the Registrar acting administratively would be empowered to defeat 
indefeasibility in circumstances where a Court cannot. 
… 
We do not favour the alternative view … If there were power to impeach an indefeasible 
title, there seems no reason why it should not be used, but in our view the Registrar has no 
such power. 
 
In Minister of Conservation55 the Court cited with approval a decision of the then Supreme 
Court in Re Mangatainoka 1BC No 2.56 There the Court held the Registrar had the power to 
alter the register on discovering that an entry had been made in error (and wrongfully), and that 
the alteration applied retrospectively. Chambers and Robertson JJ in Minister of Conservation 
said the Mangatainoka case was:57 
 
[A]uthority for the proposition that … title ‘can be corrected’, but only by the District Land 
Registrar … or by the High Court on appropriate proceedings under the Land Transfer Act.  
 
They concluded the 1998 decision of the Maori Land Court which was in question had been 
“wrongly made” and suggested that at the time the issue could have been brought before the 
Registrar under a request for the exercise of their discretion under s 81.58  
 
Thus the two most recent judgements which consider s 81 are two Court of Appeal judgments 
which take conflicting stances on its scope and application. This highlights the controversy s 81 
has caused—and continues to cause. For this to be resolved a claim would have to be taken 
under s 81 through to the Supreme Court. So far, this has not occurred, and nor is it likely to 
given the apparent reluctance of those dealing with the LTA to request an exercise of the 
Registrar’s discretion.  
 
Some hesitation may be a result of statements released by the then Registrar-General following 
the judgment in Housing Corporation. McGechan J acknowledged the wide application of s 81, 
but strongly suggested that s 81 was “an unwanted anachronism”,59 and the Registrar should 
  
54  At [156] and [158]. 
55  Minister of Conservation, above n 52. 
56  Re Mangatainoka 1BC No 2 (1913) 33 NZLR 23, approved in Minister of Conservation, above n 52, at 
[95]. 
57  Minister of Conservation, above n 52, at [95] (emphasis in original).  
58  At [104]. 
59  Housing Corporation, above n 41, at 701.  
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use extreme caution in exercising this discretion for fear of being labelled an “activist” and 
“looked upon in askance”.60 Shortly after this judgement the Registrar-General released the 
following:61 
 
Notwithstanding the affirmation some 21 years ago by the Privy Council of the existence 
of extensive powers of cancellation by the DLR [District Land Registrar], our DLRs have 
not since then in any way menaced titles … but have continued to take the view that if an 
issue lies between parties the opinion of the High Court must first be obtained. Only when 
advised by the Court in contentious situations will the DLR exercise the discretion given 
by s 81 of the LTA 1952. 
 
He justified this by saying:62 
 
This note is intended to provide, on our part as Registrars, a public assurance that there will 
not be a change in attitude from within the titles system, thus affirming in effect the 
pragmatic approach taken by McGechan J. 
 
This stance has an important consequence. Section 81 is a statutory provision which grants a 
discretionary power on the Registrar within the meaning of the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972.63 If the Registrar refuses to exercise this discretion on request, or fails to follow the rules 
of natural justice (in applying a pre-determined policy decision which to always refuse to correct 
the register under s 81), this decision can be judicially reviewed on application to the High 
Court.64 An aggrieved party also has the ability under s 216 of the LTA to contest the refusal of 
the Registrar to exercise their powers.65 Thus if a situation arises where the Registrar is asked 
to consider exercising their s 81 powers, they must undertake a true exercise of discretion and 
provide appropriate reasons for their decision. The blanket policy elucidated in the Registrar’s 
statement above is not a true exercise of discretion.  
C Making Sense of the Chaos 
Currently the highest authority which discusses the application of s 81 is still the Privy Council 
decision of Frazer, which acknowledges the wide scope and “significant and extensive” nature 
of the discretion. The turmoil seen in the courts surrounding s 81 is likely a result of the widely 
held belief amongst many involved in our land transfer system that s 81 is more of a menace 
than anything else, threatening indefeasibility as Pandora’s box threatened the stability of 
  
60  At 699. 
61  BE Hayes “DLRs and the Power to Cancel Registration” (1988) 4 BCB 255 at 256. 
62  At 256. 
63  Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 3, definition of “statutory power”.  
64  McMorland, above n 32, at 139.  
65  Hinde and others, above n 42, at 347.  
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Ancient Greece. This opinion is based on a misplaced belief in the inscrutable importance of 
the rule of immediate indefeasibility. As evidenced by Torrens,66 and acknowledged by the Law 
Commission,67 the Torrens system was based on the idea of protection—both dynamic and 
static— in order to underwrite the costs of the deed system and provide a measure of certainty 
and security to those dealing with the transfer and ownership of land rights; in other words to 
provide “rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty”.68 
  
The main consequence of the decision in Frazer is that in New Zealand we typically apply the 
doctrine of immediate indefeasibility. However, the Privy Council left open a major loophole. 
As well as admitting that actions in personam could in certain cases defeat a registered interest, 
they also acknowledged that “[t]he powers of the Registrar under s 81 are significant and 
extensive”.69  While the judgment clarified that the Registrar’s powers are limited by s 183, 
beyond that the extent of the Registrar’s powers was left open.  
 
Arguably these two outcomes of the Privy Council decision are “totally inconsistent”;70 they 
have elicited a general response whereby s 81 is treated as the anomaly.71 This is because 
proponents of immediate indefeasibility view a wide interpretation of s 81 as an attack on the 
preferred approach to indefeasibility. Immediate indefeasibility grants indefeasible title to a 
transactor upon registration of an interest under the LTA, even if the instrument of registration 
was void or voidable. If s 81 grants wide discretionary powers to correct the register in any case 
of “wrongful” entry on the register this would arguably make titles gained through void or 
voidable instruments defeasible—completely at odds with the theory of immediate 
indefeasibility.  
 
McMorland and Scott have both scrutinised the decision in Frazer in an attempt to address this 
issue and reconcile the Privy Council’s recognition of wide powers under s 81 with the concept 
of immediate indefeasibility.72 McMorland opines “where a registration may properly be said 
to be wrongful, although the title is ‘indefeasible’ under ss 62 and 63, the Registrar has power 
to override the ‘indefeasibility’ conferred and correct the register”.73 He does not see this as 
inconsistent with the immediate indefeasibility approach laid down in Frazer which held that 
  
66  Torrens, above n 8.  
67  Law Commission, above n 8.  
68  Douglas Adams The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (Pan Books, London, 2009) at 145.  
69  Frazer, above n 11, at 1072.  
70  Scott, above n 30, at 258. 
71  At 258. 
72  See McMorland, above n 32; and Scott, above n 30. 
73  McMorland, above n 32, at 140.  
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for all void instruments “registration is effective to vest and divest title and to protect the 
registered proprietor against adverse claims”.74  
 
Scott has a similar view, which he expresses in terms of the distinction between “allowable” 
claims, and “adverse” claims.75 He suggests the current “orthodox” understanding of Frazer as 
conferring immediate indefeasibility in the case of void documents is mistaken. He explains 
that Lord Wilberforce recognised two types of challenge to the register, which Scott categorises 
under the monikers of “adverse” and “allowable” claims. Subject only to the recognised 
statutory exceptions in ss 62 and 63, registration of an interest provides immediate protection 
against adverse claims—that is, those involving prior interests in the property which a claimant 
insists have survived the registration under the LTA of another’s same interest.76  However, 
registration does not confer immunity against “claims in personam … nor the exercise of the 
Registrar’s s 81 powers”.77 “Allowable” claims are only limited by the subsequent registration 
of someone who falls under s 183 of the LTA. The effect of this is a person who has gained title 
through a void instrument will have immediate protection against any adverse claims brought 
against the title, unless they fall within the exceptions noted in ss 62 and 63, but will not be able 
to rely on their indefeasible title in the case of any allowable claims against them, including an 
application to the Registrar under s 81.  
 
With respect, while McMorland and Scott make well-reasoned, rational arguments, they 
overcomplicate the issue. Reconciling Lord Wilberforce’s statements about immediate 
indefeasibility and the Registrar’s substantial powers under s 81 may be simplified if we 
accept that s 81 is nothing more than another statutory exception to indefeasibility.  
D Just Another Exception  
A number of exceptions to indefeasibility have been recognised by the courts. Statutory 
provisions are one of the principle means by which a title holder may be impeachable under the 
Torrens system. This includes those exceptions to indefeasibility expressly provided for in ss 
62 and 63, specific exceptions made by other statutes,78 and statutes which are seen as 
overriding the LTA.79 
 
  
74  Frazer, above n 11, at 419, 584, 654 and 1078. 
75  Scott, above n 30.  
76  Frazer, above n 11, at 1078.  
77  Scott, above n 30, at 260. 
78  See Boyd v Mayor of Wellington, above n 21, particularly discussion around the Public Works Act 1928 
at 1185, 1189−1190 per Stout CJ and 1190 per Sim J. 
79  Hinde, above n 9, at 39−40; and for example see Miller v Minister of Mines, above n 12, particularly 
discussion around the Mining Act 1926 at 567−569.  
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Section 81 should be regarded as simply another statutory exception to indefeasibility contained 
within the LTA itself. Immediate indefeasibility is a creature of the common law. As a creation 
of statute, s 81 need not comply with the theory of immediate indefeasibility. While the common 
law can facilitate the interpretation of statute, we must prevent the ‘tail wagging the dog’—in 
other words avoid the temptation of using immediate indefeasibility to interpret provisions of 
the LTA and the powers within it, and instead use the Act itself to help interpret how 
indefeasibility is applied. Attempts by the courts to read down s 81 come across as strained and 
logically insupportable. Decisions such as Chan and Dollars & Sense are examples of the 
courts’ tendency to venerate the idea of immediate indefeasibility to an illogical degree, which 
has led to suggestions that “[a]n unqualified power to cancel or correct the register book could 
strike at the very roots of indefeasibility of title”,80 a sentiment echoed in various cases over the 
years.81 A more cogent approach to interpreting s 81 is to view the provision as a discrete 
statutory exception to indefeasibility under the Act; one which grants a discretion which can be 
used to cancel or correct the register in appropriate cases.  
 
Even taking this approach, s 81 is not entirely inconsistent with immediate indefeasibility. As 
McMorland notes, there is no blanket rule under s 81 that void documents will not confer 
indefeasible title upon a registered proprietor. On its proper construction, a registered proprietor 
who has obtained title through the registration of a void document will have an immediately 
indefeasible title. If, however, a claim is brought before the Registrar and the method of 
registration is deemed to be wrongful, the Registrar can choose to exercise their discretion and 
cancel the title or correct the register. This is little different from any other exception currently 
recognised under the LTA. Furthermore, a wide interpretation of s 81 brings new meaning and 
consistency with the rest of the LTA, in particular with s 183 which perfects the title of a 
subsequent bona fide transactor which may have been defective because it was obtained through 
fraud, “or under any void or voidable instrument”, through the act of registration.82 If s 81 were 
intended to be interpreted and applied narrowly, s 183 would surely limit itself merely to 
perfecting titles which are faulty due to fraud. 
 
Yet the question still remains: if it is accepted that the Registrar has extensive powers to correct 
or cancel the register in the case of wrongful entry, should the Registrar do so; or would this 
constitute too much of an attack on indefeasibility of title which would irreparably damage our 
system of land transfer? It has been noted that, as s 81 is a statutory discretion, the Registrar 
must undertake a full and proper exercise of judgement under s 81 if called upon or risk judicial 
  
80  John Baalman The Torrens System in New South Wales (1951) at 417 as cited in Hinde, above n 9, at 53. 
81  Housing Corporation, above n 41, at 699; and Edwards v Maori Land Court of New Zealand HC 
Wellington CP 78-01, December 11 2001. 
82  Land Transfer Act, s 183; and McMorland, above n 32, at 141.  
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review. Such an exercise still allows the Registrar to decide against an exercise of their powers. 
At issue is whether the Registrar should be more open to a positive exercise of these powers, 
and more willing to cancel or correct the register in appropriate cases. 
 
IV Should the Registrar exercise these powers? 
 
Section 81 does not undermine indefeasibility. Not every registration of a void instrument will 
constitute a “wrongful” registration, and until the Registrar chooses to exercise their powers 
under the Act, a registered instrument which may be susceptible to them remains indefeasible 
and enjoys all the benefits of immediate indefeasibility.83 
 
A system instigated more than a century ago must be made flexible enough to accommodate 
changes in our society … The inflexibility of an absolute immediate indefeasibility 
principle has surfaced and it would be foolish not to accept that a practical solution must be 
found.84  
 
It may be that in most cases other exceptions to indefeasibility such as the in personam 
exception will apply such that recourse to s 81 will not be necessary. However, this does not 
lead logically to the conclusion that there is no need for s 81. Many cases have suggested that 
the powers under s 81 are wider than the exceptions to indefeasibility in ss 62 and 63.85 
Following this, if an appropriate case arises the courts should not be shy of calling on the 
Registrar to do what it cannot, and those who practice in the legal profession should not shy 
away from requesting an exercise of the Registrar’s discretion.   
 
Some justification of this proposition is necessary. The remainder of this paper focusses on 
discussing the arguments surrounding an application of s 81 powers, including how this affects 
other relevant provisions within the LTA, whether the Registrar has the resources to exercise 
such a discretion, the approach taken in other Torrens jurisdictions, and the recent Law 
Commission report released following the review of the current LTA.  
  
83  See Congregational Christian Church of Samoa Henderson Trust Board v Broadlands Finance Ltd, above 
n 41, at 715 per Barker J; Hinde and others, above n 42, at 345; Bennion, above n 9, at 161; and Hinde, 
above n 9, at 68−70.  
84  E Toomey “Fraud and Forgery in the 1990s: Can our Adherence to Frazer v Walker Survive the Strain?” 
(1994) 5 Canta LR 424 at 435. 
85  Frazer, above n 11; and Housing Corporation, above n 41. 
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A Consistency with Other Provisions within the Land Transfer Act 
1 Section 182: The Notice Provision 
Thomas J stated:86 
 
It is now over a century since the nature and purpose of the Torrens system was described 
by the Privy Council in Gibbs v Messer … The object is to save persons dealing with 
registered proprietors from the trouble and expense of going behind the register in order to 
investigate the history of the title and to satisfy themselves of its validity. This end is 
accomplished by providing that everyone who purchases land, without fraud … from a 
registered proprietor and enters his or her deed of transfer or mortgage on the register 
thereby acquires an indefeasible right notwithstanding any infirmity in the title.  
 
This reflects the view that the best way to save people from having to search through the 
transactional history of the title they are interested in is to adopt immediate indefeasibility. The 
practical effect of this is purchasers do not have to make enquiries into the validity of the 
instrument of transfer where it appears on its face to be in order.87 However, given in most 
situations the only party with the agency to ensure the transaction was valid for the purposes of 
the LTA will be the purchaser, it seems just and logical that they should bear the burden of the 
mistake. This argument was eloquently stated by Salmond J who thought that too strict an 
approach to immediate indefeasibility would encourage transactors to avoid looking into the 
validity of a transaction so as to avoid responsibility and ensure that they can claim bona fide 
intentions. Taylor similarly suggested that such an approach would encourage “careless 
conveyancing”.88   
 
Section 182 of the LTA is often used to justify the application of immediate indefeasibility in 
New Zealand. The relevant parts are set out below:89 
 
182 Purchaser from registered proprietor not affected by notice 
Except in the case of fraud, no person … dealing with … a transfer from the registered 
proprietor of any registered estate or interest shall be required … to inquire into or ascertain 
the circumstances in…which that registered owner or any previous registered owner of the 
estate or interest in question is or was registered … 
 
  
86  CN and NA Davies Ltd v Laughton [1997] 3 NZLR 705 at 712−713.  
87  Ronald Sackville “The Torrens System – Some Thoughts on Indefeasibility and Priorities” (1973) 47 ALJ 
526 at 531.  
88  Warrington Taylor “Scotching Frazer v Walker” (1970) 44 ALJ 248 at 254.  
89  Land Transfer Act, s 182.  
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Essentially transactors are legally entitled to rely on the register as to whether the vendor has 
good title. However, this section does not relieve a purchaser of the need to ensure they are in 
fact dealing with the person who is listed on the register, or of ensuring the title they are gaining 
is not void for any other reason. The section specifically states it will only apply to those 
transactors “dealing with...the registered proprietor”. Presumably then, this does not extend to 
those who have not in fact dealt with the actual registered proprietor but have transacted with a 
fraudster who used their name.90 Such a transaction would be void and so wrongfully obtained, 
and subject to s 81. Given the relative positions of the parties to ensure a valid transaction, there 
should not be a bar on the exercise of discretion in appropriate cases.  
2 The Compensation Provisions 
One of the principles of the Torrens system is that a person who has acquired an interest in land 
in good faith on the strength of the register should not be deprived of that interest without 
monetary compensation. Some have suggested that a cancellation of title under s 81 would result 
in the party who, having registered through a void transaction, is removed from the register 
being unable to claim for compensation under the LTA—making it inequitable for the Registrar 
to exercise their discretion under s 81.91  However, when the main compensation provision of 
the LTA is considered, it is clear that a person who gained title through the registration of a void 
document and is subsequently removed from the register under s 81 should be able to claim 
compensation.  
 
Section 172 is the main compensation provision of the LTA. Section 172(a) makes it clear that 
compensation can be claimed by anyone who sustains loss through any mistake by the Registrar 
in the performance of their duties.92 A party who has been removed following a s 81 
determination of “wrongful” entry would still be able to claim damages under s 172 because the 
Registrar made a mistake in registering their interest to begin with, without which they could 
not have suffered a subsequent loss. The Registrar, in allowing their interest to be registered 
made a mistake—for “whether or not registration confers immediate indefeasibility does not 
affect the status of an unregistered instrument. A person who might benefit should it obtain 
indefeasibility (as through mistake occasioned by ignorance as to its status) is not entitled to 
obtain registration”93—which is corrected upon the application of s 81.   
  
90  Hinde and others, above n 42, at 297.  
91  At 399−406; and Hinde, above n 9, at 64.  
92  Land Transfer Act, s 172(a). 
93  Westpac New Zealand Ltd v Clark, above n 24, at [13] per Elias CJ.  
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B Limited Resources? 
Hinde made the following observations with respect to the Registrar’s exercise of discretion 
under s 81:94 
 
The Courts have not regarded the procedure provided by [s 81] as appropriate for the full-
scale trial of questions of title, and have said that the Registrar’s powers of correction should 
be exercised only where the right of the applicant is demonstrably plain.95 The procedure 
is not intended to be used in cases in which grave and perhaps complicated questions of law 
and fact might arise, so that where the applicant’s right has to be made out against a 
registered title upon facts and law it should be established in a regular action.96 
 
There is some truth to that view. The Registrar no longer has the resources it once had. Extensive 
investigation may need to be undertaken to determine the facts of a particular case, or a quasi-
judicial approach necessary to determine whether a particular registration is wrongful. Perhaps 
the Registrar is ill-equipped to undertake these tasks. Even amongst those who recognise the 
need for powers such as those in s 81, there is dissatisfaction due to the discretion residing with 
the Registrar rather than the courts.97 It would be preferable if these powers were vested in the 
courts—they have greater resources and experience dealing with complex factual and legal 
situations—but currently they are not.   
 
Limited resources should not be an excuse to avoid exercising a discretion to provide a remedy 
which the Registrar alone can grant, particularly if this would result in manifest injustice. If 
necessary the courts could be used to assist in determining any factual or legal issues at play, as 
long as the ultimate decision on the question of discretion is left to the Registrar.  This should 
be a last resort. As suggested later in this paper the Registrar could adopt certain guidelines to 
steer a decision as to the exercise of the discretion. In most cases, even with limited resources, 
the Registrar should be able to utilise these guidelines to direct their inquiries and so make an 
informed and rational decision based on the facts of each individual case. 
C Overseas Jurisdictions 
New Zealand is not the only nation to utilise the Torrens system of transfer. However, not all 
take the same approach to indefeasibility; indeed “[i]mmediate indefeasibility is far from being 
the norm in the Torrens jurisdictions. It applies in Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
  
94  Hinde, above n 9, at 52.  
95  See Manahi Te Hiakai v The District Land Registrar (1909) 29 NZLR 130 at 132 per Chapman J; and 
Duthie v The District Land Registrar at Wellington (1911) 31 NZLR 245 at 250 per Sim J.  
96  See Manahi Te Hiakai v The District Land Registrar, above n 94; Duthie v The District Land Registrar 
at Wellington, above n 94; and District Land Registrar v Thompson, above n 47, at 629 per Sim J.  
97  Housing Corporation, above n 41; Law Commission, above n 8, at [2.47] and [2.49].   
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Saskatchewan and…Malaysia. Other jurisdictions generally prefer deferred indefeasibility, in 
absolute or presumptive form, or else have no clear decision rule”.98  
 
In Australia and Canada, different states or provinces have different approaches. The courts 
tend to apply either immediate or deferred indefeasibility as appropriate in the circumstances, 
depending on the facts of each case.99 It is generally thought that deferred indefeasibility yields 
more satisfactory results in cases involving void instruments, and this approach does not appear 
to have resulted in insuperable problems.100 Even some European nations with land registrations 
systems appear more in line with the concept of deferred rather than immediate 
indefeasibility.101   
 
The prevalence of such relaxed approaches to the concept of indefeasibility in other jurisdictions 
and the clear indications that this approach has more of an element of fairness than our current 
strict one should highlight the fact that a more open view of indefeasibility is required in New 
Zealand. The application of a more discretionary view of indefeasibility has not unduly affected 
Canada’s system of land transfer, or had a detrimental effect on certainty when dealing with 
land. Section 81 therefore, as an extremely limited form of discretion in the case of void 
instruments, is unlikely to destroy our Torrens system of transfer. 
D Law Commission Report on the New Land Transfer Act  
Recently the Law Commission, in conjunction with Land Information New Zealand, carried out 
a review of our current system of transfer and in mid-2010 issued a report entitled A New Land 
Transfer Act detailing their observations and suggestions for change.102 It included a draft Bill 
which was suggested as a replacement for the current LTA. Since then, no action has been taken 
by Parliament to address this, let alone enact it.  
 
The review specifically dealt with the Registrar’s powers of correction under s 81 and 
acknowledged the nature and scope of these powers are unclear.103 The Commission has 
suggested giving the Registrar administrative powers only, to correct errors, record boundary 
changes or to give effect to a court order. This would remove any argument that the Registrar 
has any extensive corrective powers. 
  
98  O’Connor, above n 16, at 63.  
99  Toomey, above n 84, at 435; Land Titles Act 1994 (Qld), s 187; Land Registration Act 2001, RSNS ch 6, 
s 35; Land Title Act, RSBC 1996, c 250, ss 25.1(1) and 297(3); and Mason, above n 27, at 16. 
100  Mason, above n 27, at 16.  
101  O’Connor, above n 16, at 60.  
102  Law Commission, above n 8.   
103  Land Information New Zealand Exposure Draft for Consultation: New Zealand Land Transfer Bill (LINZ, 
Wellington, 2013) at [5.12].  
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However, it has also proposed an extension of judicial powers by granting a limited judicial 
discretion to order the alteration of the register in appropriate cases to avoid “manifest 
injustice”.104 The current interpretation of the LTA is weighted towards the facilitation of 
transfer and protection of purchasers (as opposed to security of ownership) as can be seen from 
the preference for immediate indefeasibility of title.105 Section 81 readjusts the balance 
somewhat by giving owners a way of challenging void transactions outside of the narrow scope 
of fraud. The Commission seeks to mimic this more balanced approach by taking these powers 
and giving a (somewhat watered-down) version of them to the courts. The current system: 106  
 
[G]ives a purchaser title immediately upon registration (following Frazer), whether or not 
the transfer instrument is void or voidable. This favours facility of transfer, and immediate 
protection of purchasers … However … it does not necessarily support continued security 
of title of a registered owner. In cases of void transfer of instruments (particularly fraudulent 
transfers), immediate indefeasibility is not always fair on previously registered owners 
(especially those in occupation) who … did not wish or intend to transfer their property. 
 
In such cases the courts have tried to find ways around the injustices which may be caused by 
immediate indefeasibility by resorting to in personam claims which are justified on the basis 
that the registered owner undertook an obligation themselves to which they must be bound. 
There could be another course of action—recourse to s 81—but the courts are reluctant to open 
this avenue. However, if the Commission’s suggestions as to granting a judicial discretion is 
what has been proposed, why could the Registrar not use their current powers to do the same?  
 
It appears that the issues of interpretation surrounding s 81 stem less from its ability to 
undermine indefeasibility, and more as a result of the courts’ reluctance to acknowledge that 
such a quasi-judicial discretion is wielded by the Registrar rather than the court system. While 
the courts probably are in a better position to exercise such a discretion, until the Law 
Commission’s suggestions have been acted upon, the power resides with the Registrar. Since 
the Commission proposed a discretionary judicial power it has acknowledged that there is a 
need for such a thing. Unless the LTA is amended to reflect the suggestions made in its report, 
the Registrar should not be so quick to dismiss an application for correction or cancellation 
under s 81.  
  
104  Law Commission, above n 8, at [2.16]. 
105  At [1.11]. 
106  At [2.5]. 
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E Proposed Guidelines for the Exercise of Discretion  
Not every void transaction will lead to a registered title holder being removed from the register. 
There are many reasons for which a transaction may be void, and each case should be analysed 
on its particular facts when considering an exercise of discretion under s 81. In a Canadian 
review undertaken by the Joint Land Titles Committee, various guidelines were proposed to 
help the exercise of discretion under their version of New Zealand's LTA, including taking into 
account the following circumstances:107 
 
• the nature of the ownership and the use of the property by either of the parties; 
• the circumstances of the invalid transaction; 
• the special characteristics of the property and their appeal to the parties; 
• the willingness of one or both of the parties to receive compensation; 
• the ease with which the amount of compensation for a loss may be determined; and 
• any other circumstances that make it just and equitable to exercise or refuse to exercise 
these powers. 
 
While these guidelines were proposed in reference to an exercise of discretion by the courts 
rather than the Registrar, there is no reason why they cannot equally apply to the Registrar for 
the time being. The New Zealand Law Commission have also cited these considerations 
favourably in their report into the current LTA.108 Thus, to combat claims the exercise of s 81 
may lead to uncertainty, it is proposed that when considering an exercise of discretion under s 
81, the Registrar consider the above guidelines and only exercise their powers of cancellation 
or correction where it is clear the overall justice of the situation calls for it.   
 
Not every void transaction will lead to a registered title holder having a defeasible title—a 
transaction may be void for various reasons; for example, if one of the parties was under the 
age of 18. In such a case, if through some error or mistake the void documents were registered 
and title was issued, a Registrar would be unlikely to exercise their discretion as, assuming both 
parties were contracting willingly, there would be little injustice in allowing the underage 
transactor to remain on the register.  
 
This compares with a situation in which someone forges a certificate of title to a property owned 
by X, and—purporting to be X—sells the property to Y, who becomes the registered proprietor. 
  
107  Joint Land Titles Committee (Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, The Council of Maritime Premiers, 
Northwest Territories, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Yukon) Renovating the Foundation: Proposals for a 
Model Land Recording and Registration Act for the Provinces and Territories of Canada (Edmonton, 
1990) as cited by Law Commission, above n 8, at [2.13].  
108  Law Commission, above n 8, at [2.13]. 
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In this situation, X did not choose to give up their title, and depending on the circumstances of 
the case (for example, the length of time X had lived on the property, its value, the length of 
time X waited to bring a claim) it may be that an exercise of discretion by the Registrar which 
would return the property to X would be the route which conforms with the overall justice of 
the situation. Taylor suggests that it is this—the risk of losing security of title through a forged 
instrument—that is the main danger of an immediate indefeasibility approach to land transfer.109  
 
This more guided approach to s 81 may relieve many of the issues of uncertainty surrounding 
its use, and also align more with the powers of the court proposed in the draft Bill for the new 
LTA. 
 
V Conclusion  
 
A wide interpretation of s 81 of the LTA fills a gap in the current legislative scheme. It has been 
continually noted that the current strict approach to immediate indefeasibility and the issue of 
void instruments can lead to unfair results, and the suggestions made in the Law Commission 
report on the current Act acknowledge the need for a mechanism to deal with these sorts of 
situations. A wide interpretation of the Registrar’s powers also better conforms to the dual 
purposes of the Torrens system itself: to provide both dynamic and static security to those 
involved in the sale and purchase of land. Such an interpretation is consistent with New 
Zealand’s current approach to indefeasibility, as it merely exists alongside the various other 
exceptions to indefeasibility which are already recognised and accepted by the courts.  
 
If in the future an appropriate case were to come before the Registrar, should they exercise the 
discretion conferred by Parliament, it will not be the proverbial opening of Pandora’s box. 
Instead, it could correct a severe injustice caused by an overly conservative approach to 
indefeasibility of title.  
 
 
 
Word Count: The text of this paper (excluding cover page, contents, abstract, contextual 
footnotes and bibliography) consists of exactly 7999 words.  
  
109   Taylor, above n 87.  
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